Jason Johnson v. Prohealth Care

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 13, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP1904 Cir. Ct. No. 2023CV1503

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

JASON JOHNSON,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

PROHEALTH CARE, PROHEALTH CARE MORELAND SURGERY, CTR AND
DOBBERSTEIN LAW FIRM, LLC,

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Waukesha County:
MICHAEL P. MAXWELL, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Neubauer, P.J., Gundrum, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP1904

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jason Johnson appeals from an order dismissing his
complaint against ProHealth Care, ProHealth Care Moreland Surgery, CTR, and
Dobberstein Law Firm, LLC. Johnson argues that the circuit court erred in
dismissing his claims brought under WIS. STAT. § 427.104(1)(j), (k) (2023-24)1 of
the Wisconsin Consumer Act (“WCA”) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2), (3) (2024) of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 802.06(2)(a)(6). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On March 20, 2023, Attorney Michael Hickey of Dobberstein Law
Firm, LLC, filed a small claims complaint on behalf of ProHealth Care Moreland
Surgery, CTR (“PCM”) against Johnson to recover medical debt. The complaint
claimed an outstanding balance, including interest, of $1,304.86, in addition to
unspecified costs and attorney fees.

¶3 After being served with the summons and complaint, Johnson
contacted PCM and was referred to Dobberstein. Johnson alleges a Dobberstein
employee told him that he owed more than the $1,304.86 alleged in the complaint
because “legal fees,” including “filing and service charges[,]” had been added.
Johnson “objected and said that those fees had not been awarded yet.” The
Dobberstein employee “then told Johnson something to the effect that Dobberstein
would ‘get’ the fees eventually.” Johnson was also told that if he paid $1,304.86, it
would be considered a “partial payment[,]” and that “Johnson could pay $1,400 as
full payment on the debt.” Johnson paid $1,304.86 “because he did not know
whether he could be compelled to pay more[.]” On April 11, 2023, Dobberstein

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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submitted a proposed order dismissing the case with prejudice and the circuit court
signed it the same day.

¶4 On September 21, 2023, Johnson commenced this action against
PCM, ProHealth Care (together referred to as “ProHealth”), and Dobberstein, and
later filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint set forth four causes of
action, two under the WCA and two under the FDCPA. Two of Johnson’s claims
are based on the allegation that Attorney Hickey had minimal information about
Johnson’s debt and an extremely high workload,2 such that he was not
“meaningfully involved” in preparing the small claims complaint and a prior
demand letter: (1) violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) against Dobberstein only; and
(2) violation of WIS. STAT. § 427.104(1)(k) against all defendants. The other two
claims arise from Defendants’ demand for legal fees that had not yet been awarded
by the circuit court: (1) violation of § 1692e(2) against Dobberstein only; and
(2) violation of § 427.104(1)(j) against all defendants. Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 802.06(2)(a)6. for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court granted the motion
and issued a written decision dismissing the complaint in its entirety on August 9,
2024.

DISCUSSION

¶5 Johnson asks this court to determine: (1) whether his amended
complaint states a claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) and WIS.
STAT. § 427.104(1)(k) based on the allegation that Attorney Hickey was not

2
Johnson alleged various figures to illustrate Attorney Hickey’s workload, including the
number of cases he files per day, the number of hearings he has each week, the number of demand
letters he approves each day, and that he was the attorney of record for 3,189 cases in Wisconsin
courts as of December 27, 2023.

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“meaningfully involved” in preparing the demand letter and complaint; and
(2) whether the complaint states a claim for violation of § 1692e(2) and
§ 427.104(1)(j) based on the allegation that the defendants demanded costs that had
not yet been awarded by the circuit court.

¶6 “Whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted
is a question of law for our independent review; however, we benefit from
discussions of the ... circuit court.” Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC,
2014 WI 86, ¶17, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693. When reviewing a motion to
dismiss, we accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Id., ¶18.
“However, legal conclusions asserted in a complaint are not accepted, and legal
conclusions are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

¶7 The interpretation and application of Wisconsin and federal statutes
also present questions of law that this court reviews de novo. See State v. Alger,
2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346; Alberte v. Anew Health Care
Servs., Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶7, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515. “We employ the
same methodology to interpret a federal statute as we do when we interpret a state
statute; that is, we start with the text of the statute. If the statute’s meaning is plain,
then our inquiry ordinarily stops.” Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. DOR, 2006 WI 88,
¶36, 293 Wis. 2d 202, 717 N.W.2d 280.

I. Meaningful Involvement Claims

¶8 Johnson brings two causes of action arising from Attorney Hickey’s
alleged lack of “meaningful involvement” in preparing a demand letter and small
claims complaint: (1) a claim pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) of the FDCPA
against Dobberstein only; and (2) a claim under WIS. STAT. § 427.104(1)(k) of the
WCA against all defendants. The “meaningful involvement” doctrine arose from

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federal caselaw construing § 1692e(3), which prohibits the “false representation or
implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an
attorney.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3). Some courts have held that a communication is
not truly “from” an attorney if the attorney did not directly control or supervise the
process through which it was sent. See, e.g., Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 228-29
(7th Cir. 1996) (to comply with § 1692e(3), a lawyer must have involvement in the
process, such as reviewing the consumer’s file, deciding that they are a candidate
for legal action, deciding to send the communication, and reviewing the
communication before it is sent). Accordingly, the doctrine holds that a
communication from an attorney that is not the product of such professional
involvement is “misleading” and violates § 1692e. Avila, 84 F.3d at 228-29. To
date, five federal circuits have adopted the “meaningful involvement” doctrine. See,
e.g., Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1320-21 (2d Cir. 1993); Avila, 84 F. 3d at
228-29; Kistner v. Law Offs. of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC, 518 F.3d 433, 439-
40 (6th Cir. 2008); Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 604, 607 (5th Cir. 2009); Lesher
v. Law Offs. of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 1003 (3d Cir. 2011). Johnson
argues that § 427.104(1)(k) of the WCA should be interpreted to incorporate the
federal doctrine because § 427.104(1)(k) is the “WCA equivalent” of § 1692e(3)
and “must be liberally interpreted to align with the FDCPA.”

¶9 In its Decision and Order, the circuit court dismissed the complaint in
its entirety, implicitly rejecting Johnson’s 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) “meaningful
involvement” claim. The plain language of § 1692e(3) says nothing about an
attorney’s “meaningful involvement” in debt collection efforts, and the parties do
not address whether or not this court should interpret § 1692e(3) to include a

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“meaningful involvement” requirement.3 We decline to recognize a new
“meaningful involvement” claim under § 1692e(3) of the FDCPA, as “it is [the
Wisconsin Supreme C]ourt’s function to develop and clarify the law.” State ex rel.
Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988). In
contrast, “[t]he primary function of the court of appeals is error correction.” Blum
v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins. Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶50, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78
(“[T]he court of appeals’ law-developing role is secondary and arises only ‘under
some circumstances,’ as the court is required to ‘adapt [ ] the common law and
interpret[ ] the statutes and federal and state constitutions in the cases it decides.’”
(citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Sussex Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Mainline Sewer &
Water, Inc., 231 Wis. 2d 404, 416 n.4, 605 N.W.2d 620 (Ct. App. 1999) (declining
to address whether the economic loss doctrine applies to a negligent provision of
services because the appellate court is not the appropriate avenue for law creation).
Therefore, we affirm dismissal of Johnson’s § 1692e(3) meaningful involvement
claim.4

¶10 Next, we turn to Johnson’s meaningful involvement claim under the
WCA. WISCONSIN STAT. § 427.104(1)(k) prohibits a debt collector from using “a
communication which … gives the appearance of being authorized, issued or
approved by a[n] … attorney-at-law when it is not[.]” Sec. 427.104(1)(k). Johnson
argues that § 427.104(1)(k) is the “WCA equivalent” of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) and,
therefore, § 427.104(1)(k) should also be interpreted to require an attorney’s
“meaningful involvement.” However, after briefing was completed in this case, we

3
We note that this issue was not before the court in Plaza Services LLC v. Burton, 2025
WI App 51, 418 Wis. 2d 123, 25 N.W.3d 556, and therefore remains an open question.
4
“[W]e may affirm on grounds different than those relied on by the trial court.” Vanstone
v. Town of Delafield, 191 Wis. 2d 586, 595, 530 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Ct. App. 1995).

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rejected this same argument in a published decision, Plaza Services LLC v. Burton,
2025 WI App 51, 418 Wis. 2d 123, 25 N.W.3d 556. Plaza Services declined to
recognize a meaningful involvement requirement in the WCA. See id., ¶23.
Accordingly, consistent with Plaza Services, we affirm the dismissal of Johnson’s
§ 427.104(1)(k) claim.

II. Claims Based On Demand For Payment Of Costs Not Yet Awarded

¶11 Johnson brings two causes of action arising from Defendants’ demand
for payment of costs that had not yet been awarded by the circuit court: (1) an
FDCPA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) against Dobberstein only; and (2) a
WCA claim under WIS. STAT. § 427.104(1)(j) against all defendants.

¶12 Johnson argues that Dobberstein employees falsely represented the
amount and legal status of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) when
they demanded payment of “legal fees, including filing and service charges” to fully
resolve the debt. To state a claim under § 1692e, a party must allege facts sufficient
for a jury to find that the debt collector made a false statement that would mislead
an unsophisticated consumer. Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 799-800
(7th Cir. 2009). An unsophisticated consumer “possesses rudimentary knowledge
about the financial world, is wise enough to read collection notices with added care,
possesses ‘reasonable intelligence,’ and is capable of making basic logical
deductions and inferences.” Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211
F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

¶13 We agree with the circuit court that Johnson has not alleged facts that
would plausibly mislead an “unsophisticated consumer.” Both the small claims
complaint and Dobberstein communicated that any amount sought beyond
$1,304.86 was attributed to legal fees. Thus, they did not misrepresent the “amount

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No. 2024AP1904

or legal status” of the debt pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). These facts
markedly differ from those cases where the consumer sufficiently stated a
§ 1692e(2)(A) claim. For example, in Fields v. Wilber Law Firm, P.C., 383 F.3d
562 (7th Cir. 2004), the debt collector sent a dunning letter listing the “account
balance” as $388.54, more than double the original veterinary debt of $122.06,
without explaining that it was seeking attorney fees of $250. See id. at 566. The
Fields court held that by failing to specify the components of the debt, the debt
collector “le[ft] the door open” for an unsophisticated consumer to “logically
assume that she simply incurred nearly $400 in charges[,]” and the court therefore
reversed dismissal of Fields’ § 1692e(2)(A) claim. Fields, 383 F.3d at 566; see
also, Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a debt
collector communication was misleading where it failed to identify the principal
balance as separate from treble damages, which had not yet been awarded by the
court).

¶14 Additionally, Johnson’s reliance on Shula v. Lawent, 359 F.3d 489
(7th Cir. 2004) is misplaced. Shula does not support Johnson’s argument because
in that case, the debt collector demanded payment of circuit court costs after the
collection suit had been dismissed without a judgment awarding costs. See id. at
491. In other words, the debt collector in Shula demanded costs that it could no
longer legally recover, whereas ProHealth still had the legal right to seek those costs
when it engaged in the collection activity at issue. Furthermore, under the Illinois
law applied in Shula, the award of costs was not automatic, rather it was up to the
judge’s discretion. Id. In contrast, under applicable Wisconsin law, the award of
costs to the prevailing party is automatic. See WIS. STAT. § 799.25.

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¶15 For those reasons, we are not persuaded that Johnson adequately
alleged an FDCPA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A), and we affirm the
dismissal of that claim.

¶16 Turning to Johnson’s remaining cause of action under WIS. STAT.
§ 427.104(1)(j), he argues it is viable “because the WCA must be construed in
accordance with the FDCPA,” hence if the 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) claim is viable,
the § 427.104 claim must also be. But the reverse must also be true: we have
determined that Johnson failed to allege a claim under § 1692e(2)(A), therefore his
§ 427.104(1)(j) claim fails as well. We also note that the two statutes at issue do
not contain the same language,5 so it is not evident why they would be construed in
the same way. See Plaza Services, 418 Wis. 2d 123, ¶¶23-25 (statutes not construed

5
WIS. STAT.§ 427.104(1) states in relevant part:

(1) In attempting to collect an alleged debt arising from a
consumer credit transaction or other consumer transaction …
where there is an agreement to defer payment, a debt collector
may not:

….

(j) Claim, or attempt or threaten to enforce a right with
knowledge or reason to know that the right does not exist[.]

15 U.S.C. § 1692e states in relevant part:

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or
misleading representation or means in connection with the
collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application
of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this
section:

….

(2) The false representation of—

(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt[.]

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No. 2024AP1904

identically when language differs). Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s
dismissal of Johnson’s § 427.104(1)(j) claim.

CONCLUSION

¶17 In summary, we agree that all of Johnson’s claims under the WCA
and FDCPA were properly dismissed. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s order.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

2