City of Mequon v. Scott Sarver Lindvall

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 13, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP1703 Cir. Ct. No. 2023TR2823

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

CITY OF MEQUON,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

SCOTT SARVER LINDVALL,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Ozaukee County:
STEVEN M. CAIN, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 GROGAN, J.1 Scott Sarver Lindvall appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered following a court trial after which the circuit court found him
guilty of Operating a Motor Vehicle with a Prohibited Alcohol Content (PAC)

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2023-24). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2025AP1703

contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(b) (2023-24) as a first offense.2 On appeal,
Lindvall specifically challenges the court’s pre-trial order denying his motion
seeking to suppress the blood test result obtained pursuant to WIS. STAT.
§ 343.305, Wisconsin’s Implied Consent Law, on the ground that his consent to
the blood draw was coerced and therefore involuntary and in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.3 This court concludes Lindvall’s consent was not coerced
and that he voluntarily consented. Because the circuit court did not err, this court
affirms, albeit on alternate grounds.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 The following facts are generally undisputed. At around 9:30 p.m.
on September 14, 2023, Lindvall was on his way home to Shorewood from a
bourbon tasting event at the Ozaukee Country Club in Mequon when he failed to

2
The Notice of Appeal, although properly identifying the Ozaukee County Circuit Court
in the header, states that Lindvall “appeals from the Entry of Judgment of the Circuit Court for
Brown County” and that Lindvall “was convicted of Operating a Motor Vehicle While
Intoxicated – First Offense contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a).” (Emphasis added.) Given
that both the Judgment of Conviction and CCAP notes for this matter reflect a conviction for
violating § 346.63(1)(b)—not § 346.63(1)(a)—this court assumes the references to § 346.63(1)(a)
and the “Circuit Court for Brown County” in Lindvall’s Notice of Appeal are typographical
errors. “CCAP” is the acronym commonly used to refer to the Consolidated Court Automation
Program, which “is a case management system provided by [the] Wisconsin Circuit Court Access
program” that “provides public access online to reports of activity in Wisconsin circuit courts[.]”
State v. Bonds, 2006 WI 83, ¶6, 292 Wis. 2d 344, 717 N.W.2d 133. Appellate courts may take
judicial notice of CCAP records. See WIS. STAT. § 902.01; see also State v. Aderemi, 2023 WI
App 8, ¶7 n.3, 406 Wis. 2d 132, 986 N.W.2d 306.

This court also notes that Lindvall, in a reply brief filed in the circuit court, criticized the
City’s counsel for obvious typographical errors in its briefing, going so far as to state that
“Mr. Lindvall will assume that the City was using a ‘canned brief’ and simply engaged in a
monumental proofreading error by referring to a motion that had presumably been filed in another
of the City’s cases” and that he “urges the City to pay closer attention to its work product[.]” The
court trusts that all parties should take care to provide the court with accurate facts in the filings.
3
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

2
No. 2025AP1703

navigate a sharp curve in the road and crashed his motor vehicle through a tree
line.4 When City of Mequon police officers located Lindvall, his vehicle was
approximately 100 feet off the road and had sustained significant damage,
including the airbags having been deployed. According to City of Mequon Police
Officer Brandy Campbell, when she approached Lindvall, he was “using his car
for balance, and had red, glossy eyes.” Her report also noted Lindvall “was
unsteady on his feet, and was swaying from side to side.” Lindvall admitted he
had been at the bourbon tasting event, and when Officer Campbell questioned
whether he thought he was in any condition to be driving, he responded to the
effect of “in retrospect not so much.”

¶3 Officer Campbell observed that Lindvall’s nose appeared to be
swollen and that he was bleeding from a laceration to the back of his head.
Paramedics arrived on scene and transported Lindvall to the hospital. Officer
Campbell did not conduct field sobriety tests on the scene due to Lindvall’s
injuries.

¶4 While at the hospital, Officer Campbell explained to Lindvall that
she wished to conduct field sobriety tests given the circumstances of the accident
and Lindvall’s admission he had been drinking. Lindvall agreed. At the
evidentiary hearing, Officer Campbell testified she asked Lindvall how he was
feeling throughout the tests and explained the various tests she performed. For
example, she conducted a modified horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test with

4
Some of the background facts come from Officer Campbell’s body camera recording,
which was submitted to the circuit court and is part of the appellate Record. This court has
reviewed the portions of that recording submitted to the circuit court for its review. This court
further notes that the parties generally do not dispute the underlying facts, but rather the
application of the law to those facts.

3
No. 2025AP1703

Lindvall seated at the edge of the bed, as well as an alphabet test requiring
Lindvall to recite the alphabet beginning with the letter D and ending at N. She
reported observing “[a]ll six clues” and “vertical gaze nystagmus” on the HGN
test, and although Lindvall correctly began with the letter D on the alphabet test,
“he went all the way to X” before “he stopped and said he forgot which letter” to
go to and then began again with D, reciting “all the way to Y” before saying “R”
and then the letter “Z.” Officer Campbell also asked Lindvall to count from 22 to
33, which he did correctly aside from beginning with the number 23, and she also
conducted a counting test wherein Lindvall was to “count[] and touch[] his
fingertips at the same time.” According to Officer Campbell, Lindvall performed
“[p]oorly” on the various tests, and she informed him that based on the tests and
the totality of the circumstances, she was taking him into custody for operating
while under the influence.

¶5 Officer Campbell thereafter read Lindvall the Informing the Accused
Form (the Form), see WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4), and asked if he was willing to
consent to a blood draw. Lindvall responded by requesting to speak to an
attorney, and a brief conversation between Officer Campbell and Lindvall ensued.5
First, Officer Campbell sought to clarify whether Lindvall’s statement that he
wished to speak to an attorney meant he was not willing to submit to the blood
draw. Lindvall responded “Yes[,]” and Officer Campbell again sought
clarification. After Lindvall confirmed he was refusing to consent to the blood
draw, Officer Campbell stated:

5
In its Response brief, the City provided a transcription of this conversation, which was
captured on Officer Campbell’s body camera. Lindvall does not dispute the accuracy of this
transcription in his Reply brief, and as previously noted, this court has reviewed the body camera
recording to ascertain its accuracy.

4
No. 2025AP1703

Ok, so you have to, you, you have to you either submit to it
or not, so, we can’t wait for a lawyer or anything like that,
we can’t say anything that will convince you otherwise,
understand that if you refuse then that is automatic
revocation of your driver status, um … so … that’s kinda,
that’s what they mean by saying that there’s, um, other
penalties that kinda go along with that. So, at this time,
right now, are you willing to submit to a test of your blood?

Lindvall responded, “No.” After a brief pause, Lindvall re-initiated the
conversation, stating he did not “know anything about this but” that it “fe[lt] like
[he] should talk to a lawyer first.” Officer Campbell reiterated that doing so was
not an option at that point and that he could speak to an attorney before going to
court, and she again informed Lindvall he had two options: “So the option is either
get blood taken, or not get blood taken right now.” Another brief pause followed
before Lindvall again re-engaged, stating “I don’t know, I’ve heard, like,
shitshows about this, um. I don’t know.”

¶6 As before, Officer Campbell reiterated that she “can’t really sway
[him] either direction” and again stated “there’s penalties for refusing” and that
“there’s a time for all of that and a place but it’s not right now.” When Lindvall
asked what she was saying, Officer Campbell again explained she “can’t swing
[him] in either decision, [he] ha[s] to make the decision on [his] own [of his] own
free will if [he]’d like to submit to the” blood test. When Lindvall asked “[w]hat
else” she could tell him, Officer Campbell said she could not tell him anything
else “[b]ecause anything else is gonna sound like [she’s] kinda forcing [him] to do
it.” She reiterated the same again after Lindvall stated he understood the “gist” of
what she was saying was “don’t fuck with this,” clarifying:

That’s not what I’m saying, I’m saying, I can’t, like, I can’t
give you further info like, well if you don’t then this
happens, because that makes it sound like I’m forcing you
to choose one direction or the other and I can’t do that. All

5
No. 2025AP1703

I can tell you is give you the facts, these are the facts of it.
This is where we’re at in the process right now[.]

Lindvall asked Officer Campbell to repeat the facts and she obliged, explaining he
was under arrest, that the police department wished to test his blood to determine
his blood alcohol concentration (BAC), and that he had two options: “[Y]ou can
either at this point in the process, consent to us having the hospital staff draw your
blood, that we’re going to test to see your alcohol level, or say that you’re not
going to do that, that you refuse to have that testing done.” Lindvall simply
responded “Okay,” and when Officer Campbell asked if that meant he was willing
to consent to the blood draw, Lindvall said “Yes.”6

¶7 After receiving the results of Lindvall’s blood test, which showed a
0.178 BAC, the City issued Lindvall a citation for operating with a prohibited
alcohol content contrary to city ordinance 82-17 and WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(b) as

6
In his appellate brief, Lindvall states that at the suppression hearing, “Officer Campbell
conceded” that after reading Lindvall the Form, “the last thing she told Mr. Lindvall prior to him
giving his consent to a blood test was that ‘if he refused, his license would be revoked
automatically.’” (First emphasis added.) This court has reviewed the Record and concludes this
statement does not accurately represent the interaction between Officer Campbell and Lindvall.
While it is true that Officer Campbell responded “Correct” when Lindvall’s counsel asked her
whether “ultimately … the last thing that [she] told [Lindvall] before he gave [her] the only yes
that [she] got from him” regarding consent was that “if he refused his license would be revoked
automatically[,]” the body camera exchange in the Record does not reflect the same.
Specifically, although the body camera recording reflects that Officer Campbell did state that if
Lindvall refused the blood draw, “then that is automatic revocation of [his] driver status,” the
statement about “automatic revocation” occurred near the beginning of that exchange—not at the
end, and not immediately prior to Lindvall stating “yes” in response to Officer Campbell asking
whether Lindvall would consent following her responses to Lindvall’s multiple questions.

This court’s review of the Record also revealed that although Lindvall, in his appellate
brief-in-chief, only mentions the modified HGN test, Officer Campbell in fact conducted multiple
other field sobriety tests. Parties should always present the court with a complete and accurate
factual account.
7
MEQUON, WIS., CODE § 82-1 (1996).

6
No. 2025AP1703

a first offense. Prior to trial, Lindvall filed multiple motions seeking to suppress
the BAC results, only one of which—his motion asserting his consent to the blood
draw had been coerced—is relevant on appeal.8 In that motion, Lindvall asserted
his consent was coerced, and therefore involuntary, for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Generally speaking, he argued his consent was coerced because Officer
Campbell’s statement that license revocation would be “automatic” if he refused
to consent was incorrect both because revocation is not “automatic” under the
Implied Consent Law unless an individual fails to timely request a refusal hearing,
and because a driver may ultimately prevail at a requested revocation hearing.
Accordingly, he said, the “misstatement of the law sends a clear message to
Mr. Lindvall that if he wanted to maintain his operating privilege beyond the day
of his arrest, he had no choice but to consent to a test rather than exercising his
right to refuse the same.”

¶8 The City disagreed with Lindvall’s contention that Officer Campbell
had provided incorrect information because, it said, WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4),
which sets forth the language utilized in the Form, requires only that an individual

8
Lindvall also sought suppression on the grounds that Officer Campbell violated the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement in regard to her discussion with medical
personnel as to whether Lindvall would receive fluids at the hospital and that the field sobriety
tests were unreliable under the circumstances, and therefore there was no probable cause to arrest
and seek consent for the blood draw. Additionally, Lindvall filed a motion seeking a declaration
that WIS. STAT. § 343.305 is unconstitutional under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.

Lindvall does not raise any of these arguments on appeal. Those arguments are therefore
deemed abandoned, and this court will not address them further. See, e.g., A.O. Smith Corp. v.
Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491-93, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) (issue raised in the
circuit court but not argued on appeal is deemed abandoned); State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627,
647, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (appellate courts need not address undeveloped
arguments). Moreover, we recently rejected an essentially identical constitutional challenge to
WIS. STAT. § 343.305 in County of Trempealeau v. Stenberg, No. 2024AP281, slip op.
recommended for publication (WI App Apr. 21, 2026).

7
No. 2025AP1703

be informed that his “operating privilege will be revoked” for refusing to consent
to a requested test pursuant to the Informed Consent Law. According to the City,
this was sufficient to satisfy the test set forth in County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198
Wis. 2d 269, 280, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995), abrogated on other grounds
by Washburn County v. Smith, 2008 WI 23, ¶64, 308 Wis. 2d 65, 746 N.W.2d
243. The City also pointed to County of Dunn v. Cormican, No. 2020AP1895,
unpublished slip op. (WI App Feb. 7, 2023),9 a case in which we recently rejected
an argument similar to Lindvall’s regarding the word “automatic” in the context of
license revocation under the Implied Consent Law.

¶9 In April 2024, the circuit court held a hearing to hear the parties’
arguments and take Officer Campbell’s testimony. The court held an additional
hearing in July 2024 at which time it denied Lindvall’s motion.10 After recounting
Officer Campbell’s testimony—particularly noting her descriptions of Lindvall at
the scene, Lindvall’s admission he had been at a bourbon tasting, the results of the
modified field sobriety tests, and the officer’s statement that license revocation
would be “automatic” if Lindvall refused—the court, turning to both Quelle and
Cormican, concluded use of the word “automatic” was not “necessarily
misleading.” It also noted there was “a void of evidence” in regard to Quelle’s
third prong—that being whether the statement that revocation is automatic was a

9
This case may be cited for its persuasive value pursuant to WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(3)(b).
10
In addition to denying Lindvall’s suppression motions, the circuit court also granted
the City’s request to subpoena Lindvall’s medical records from the hospital to obtain the BAC
results of the hospital’s non-evidentiary blood draw it had taken during the course of treatment
immediately following Lindvall’s accident. Those records reflect a BAC of 0.210, and the court
granted the City’s motion in limine seeking an order that the hospital results were admissible—a
ruling Lindvall does not challenge on appeal.

8
No. 2025AP1703

“causal connection” as to Lindvall’s decision to consent. Accordingly, the court
concluded there was no Quelle violation, and in reaching this decision, it did not
reference the Fourth Amendment.

¶10 The matter ultimately proceeded to a court trial in July 2025, and the
circuit court found Lindvall guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited
alcohol concentration as a first offense. Lindvall appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 When reviewing a circuit court’s decision on a suppression motion,
this court will uphold the circuit court’s factual findings unless those findings are
clearly erroneous. State v. Scull, 2015 WI 22, ¶16, 361 Wis. 2d 288, 862 N.W.2d
562. The application of constitutional principles to those facts, however, is a
question of law this court reviews de novo. Id.; see also State v. Blackman, 2017
WI 77, ¶25, 377 Wis. 2d 339, 898 N.W.2d 774.

III. DISCUSSION

¶12 The primary issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in
denying Lindvall’s motion seeking suppression of the BAC evidence obtained as a
result of the blood draw. The answer depends upon whether Lindvall voluntarily
consented to having his blood drawn—a question which, in this case, turns largely
(although not exclusively) on whether Officer Campbell’s statement regarding
“automatic” revocation was misleading.

¶13 Lindvall frames the issue as implicating the Fourth Amendment,
contending his consent was coerced rather than voluntary because Officer
Campbell, he says, misrepresented the license revocation process under the
Implied Consent Law. In doing so, he asserts the circuit court erred in failing to

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No. 2025AP1703

engage in a Fourth Amendment analysis and instead incorrectly—and
problematically—considered only whether Lindvall was entitled to relief under
Quelle.

¶14 Lindvall first cites State v. Forrett, 2022 WI 37, 401 Wis. 2d 678,
974 N.W.2d 422, and State v. Brar, 2017 WI 73, 376 Wis. 2d 685, 898 N.W.2d
499, for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment applies in the Implied
Consent Law context and that he therefore had a right to refuse the requested
blood test and accept the consequences arising therefrom. He also argues the City
failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he had voluntarily
consented to the warrantless blood draw. See State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180,
197, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).

¶15 According to Lindvall, his consent was not voluntary because it was
the product of improper coercion stemming from what he says was misleading
information and that his consent was merely “acquiescence to a claim of lawful
authority.” See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968). He
further contends the totality of the circumstances factors set forth in State v. Artic,
2010 WI 83, ¶33, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430, support his position. This is
so, he says, because our supreme court in Blackman, which considered whether
the driver’s consent to a blood draw was coerced, focused its totality of the
circumstances discussion largely on its conclusion that law enforcement there had
misrepresented information regarding license revocation to Blackman. See
Blackman, 377 Wis. 2d 339, ¶¶2, 60. Lindvall says his case is “very much like
Blackman in several aspects[,]” including that this was his first offense, he
“remained cooperative,” Officer Campbell was not “physically intimidating,” and
because Officer Campbell’s statement that license revocation would be

10
No. 2025AP1703

“automatic” “if he refused a blood test is tantamount to the same type of coercion
derided by the Blackman court[.]”

¶16 Finally, Lindvall faults the circuit court for addressing his
suppression motion under Quelle rather than the Fourth Amendment, stating its
“reliance on Quelle was … misplaced because at the time Quelle was decided, no
‘constitutional right to refuse’ testing existed.” Lindvall further argues the court
erred in relying on Cormican, which he asserts is distinguishable, because there
“the defendant admitted that he ‘understood that [he] had a decision to make’ even
in light of the statements made by the arresting officer.” See Cormican,
No. 2020AP1895, ¶9 (alteration in original).

¶17 In contrast, the City primarily addresses the suppression issue in the
context of whether Officer Campbell substantially complied in regard to her
reading of the Form, asserting “substantial reliance” requires that Lindvall be
“inform[ed] … of the possible sanctions resulting from his taking or refusing to
take the test.” See State v. Sutton, 177 Wis. 2d 709, 714, 503 N.W.2d 326 (Ct.
App. 1993); see also Smith, 308 Wis. 2d 65, ¶62 n.52. Noting Lindvall does not
allege an error in regard to Officer Campbell’s reading of the Form, the City
contends the challenged statement—that license revocation would be “automatic”
if Lindvall refused the blood draw—amounts to an example of an officer
providing additional information and that Quelle’s three-prong analysis applies.

¶18 To that end, the City argues this court should follow Cormican,
which applied the Quelle analysis. Cormican, it says, is on point for its
persuasive value because there the Cormican court concluded a similar statement
about automatic license revocation following a refusal was not misleading, and
Cormican therefore could not satisfy Quelle’s three-prong analysis. See

11
No. 2025AP1703

Cormican, No. 2020AP1895, ¶¶16-18. Thus, it argues, this court should conclude
both that Officer Campbell’s statement substantially complied with the Implied
Consent Law’s requirements and was therefore not misleading, as well as that
Lindvall failed to carry his burden of establishing any alleged misconduct
impacted his decision under Quelle’s third prong.

¶19 The City also asserts that “Lindvall oversells the single word choice
of ‘automatically’ in the broader setting of the three-minute exchange” with
Officer Campbell and points to the multiple instances in which Officer Campbell
informed Lindvall she could not say anything to sway or force his decision and
that whether or not to consent was his choice. Similarly, the City challenges
Lindvall’s reliance on Blackman, saying that case is distinguishable because the
reason the officer’s statement there was coercive was because license revocation
did not apply to Blackman at all whereas here, revocation for refusing to consent
did apply to Lindvall. See Blackman, 377 Wis. 2d 339, ¶44. Finally, the City
contends that even if this court agrees with Lindvall, any error in failing to
suppress the results of the City’s BAC test was harmless—assuming the harmless
error analysis applies in a non-criminal traffic prosecution—because it had also
obtained the results of the hospital’s untainted blood test, which had been taken
prior to the City’s blood draw and showed an even higher BAC level.

¶20 In reply, Lindvall challenges the City’s framing of the issue as
whether Officer Campbell substantially complied with the Implied Consent Law
and reaffirms his challenge is premised on a Fourth Amendment violation. He
also seeks to distinguish Cormican on the basis that unlike in that case, there is no
evidence in the Record here that he understood he had to make a choice between
consenting and not consenting. Finally, in response to the City’s contention that
the harmless error analysis applies if an error occurred, Lindvall states he “is at a

12
No. 2025AP1703

significant disadvantage … because the plethora of facts upon which he would
rely to demonstrate that this matter is defensible are not a part of this record[,]”
which he seems to suggest is the result of this matter being an “appeal … in a civil
case” in which “the court trial was a pro forma matter employed to preserve [his]
challenge.” He also says the harmless error test would fail because the remaining
circumstances—such as the results of the field sobriety tests in light of their
modifications and his head injury—“are suspect.”

¶21 It is clear the parties dispute the framework upon which this court
should address the issue Lindvall raises. However, regardless of the rubric applied
in this matter, the result is the same: the circuit court did not err in denying
Lindvall’s suppression motion because the allegedly misleading statement was not
actually misleading and was neither coercive under the totality of the
circumstances for purposes of the Fourth Amendment nor misleading under the
three-prong Quelle analysis.

¶22 The Fourth Amendment, along with article I, section 11 of the
Wisconsin Constitution, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 11. “This court ordinarily construes the
protections of these provisions coextensively.” Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶28. A
warrantless search is “per se unreasonable”; however, “a search conducted
pursuant to consent” is a “well-established exception to the warrant
requirement[.]” Id., ¶29. “To determine if the consent exception is satisfied, we
review, first, whether consent was given in fact by words, gestures, or conduct;
and, second, whether the consent given was voluntary.” Id., ¶30; see also
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 196-97. “[W]hether consent was given in fact is a
question of historical fact.” Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶30. This court will “uphold
a finding of consent in fact if it is not contrary to the great weight and clear

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No. 2025AP1703

preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “The State bears the burden of proving that
consent was given freely and voluntarily,” which requires “clear and convincing
evidence[.]” Id., ¶32. “The determination of ‘voluntariness’ is a mixed question
of fact and law based on an evaluation of ‘the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Consent is not voluntary if the state
proves ‘no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.’” Id. (citation
omitted).

¶23 Courts look to the totality of the circumstances—such as “the
circumstances surrounding the consent and the characteristics of the defendant”—
when determining whether consent was voluntary, and “no single factor controls.”
Id., ¶33. The “non-exclusive factors” courts are to consider when “determin[ing]
whether consent was given voluntarily” include:

(1) [W]hether the police used deception, trickery, or
misrepresentation in their dialogue with the defendant to
persuade him to consent; (2) whether the police threatened
or physically intimidated the defendant or “punished” him
by the deprivation of something like food or sleep;
(3) whether the conditions attending the request to search
were congenial, non-threatening, and cooperative, or the
opposite; (4) how the defendant responded to the request to
search; (5) what characteristics the defendant had as to age,
intelligence, education, physical and emotional condition,
and prior experience with the police; and (6) whether the
police informed the defendant that he could refuse consent.

Id. (citing Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 198-203).

¶24 Lindvall does not allege an absence of consent in fact, and even if he
did, the Record would clearly belie such proposition given that Lindvall

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No. 2025AP1703

ultimately, when asked if he would consent, unequivocally responded, “Yes.”11
Accordingly, the focus turns to whether Lindvall’s consent in fact was voluntary.
Whether Lindvall voluntarily consented to the warrantless blood draw primarily
(although not exclusively) turns on whether Officer Campbell’s statement
regarding “automatic revocation” was coercive—in other words, whether it
misstated or misrepresented the Implied Consent Law. This requires consideration
of cases that have considered what the Implied Consent Law requires, including as
it relates to an officer’s recitation of the Form.

¶25 As relevant, Wisconsin’s Implied Consent Law provides that any
person who drives or operates a motor vehicle on Wisconsin’s public highways:

is deemed to have given consent to one or more tests of his
or her breath, blood or urine, for the purpose of determining
the presence or quantity in his or her blood or breath, of
alcohol, controlled substances, controlled substance
analogs or other drugs, or any combination of alcohol,
controlled substance analogs and other drugs, when
requested to do so by a law enforcement officer[.]

WIS. STAT. § 343.305(2). “Every driver in Wisconsin impliedly consents to take a
chemical test for blood alcohol content[,]” although a driver may revoke that
implied consent. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d at 277; see also Brar, 376 Wis. 2d 685, ¶39.
The Form, which incorporates the language set forth in § 343.305(4), informs a
driver of this choice. See Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d at 277-78. As relevant, that
language provides:

You have either been arrested for an offense that
involves driving or operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, or you are the

11
The circuit court did not make a specific finding regarding whether Lindvall consented
in fact as it pertains to the Fourth Amendment analysis.

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No. 2025AP1703

operator of a vehicle that was involved in an accident that
caused the death of, great bodily harm to, or substantial
bodily harm to a person, or you are suspected of driving or
being on duty time with respect to a commercial motor
vehicle after consuming an intoxicated beverage.

This law enforcement agency now wants to test one or
more samples of your breath, blood or urine to determine
the concentration of alcohol or drugs in your system. If any
test shows more alcohol in your system than the law
permits while driving, your operating privilege will be
suspended. If you refuse to take any test that this agency
requests, your operating privilege will be revoked and you
will be subject to other penalties. The test results or the
fact that you refused testing can be used against you in
court.

Sec. 343.305(4) (emphases added).

¶26 Although Cormican is not binding on this court, its recent analysis
of nearly identical challenged language in regard to revocation being “automatic”
upon refusal is persuasive, and this court agrees with its reasoning. As the
Cormican court noted, the “Form’s statement that a person’s operating privilege
‘will be revoked’ if the person refuses to take a requested test conveys the same
meaning as [the officer’s] subsequent statement … that the state would
‘automatically’ take away Cormican’s operating privilege if he refused to consent
to a blood test.” Cormican, No. 2020AP1895, ¶16. Both statements—the
statutory language and the Form—convey the same information: “that if an
individual refuses a requested test, the revocation of his or her operating privilege
will necessarily occur.” Id. Thus, the officer’s statement to Cormican that a
refusal would result in automatic revocation “did not go beyond the information”
WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4) requires, and the statement was therefore not misleading.
Cormican, No. 2020AP1895, ¶16. The same reasoning applies here.

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¶27 Lindvall also contends Officer Campbell’s statement that revocation
would be “automatic” was misleading because in practice, revocation is
“automatic” only where an individual fails to request a refusal hearing and that if
an individual does request a refusal hearing, that individual may ultimately prevail
and not have his license revoked at all.12 The Cormican court rejected a similar
argument, and this court again agrees with its reasoning and analysis. See id.,
¶¶17-18. As the Cormican court explained, concluding Officer Campbell’s
comment here—that revocation would be “automatic” if Lindvall refused—was
misleading would require this court to also conclude WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4)
itself is likewise “misleading because it fails to inform a person that his …
operating privilege may not be revoked if the person requests, and prevails at, a
refusal hearing.” See Cormican, No. 2020AP1895, ¶18. This court sees no reason
to depart from Cormican’s rationale on this point.

¶28 Having established Officer Campbell’s statement regarding
“automatic” revocation following a refusal was an accurate statement of the law
and therefore not misleading, this court readily concludes Lindvall’s consent was
voluntary under the totality of the circumstances for Fourth Amendment purposes.
First, because Officer Campbell’s statement was an accurate statement of the law,
that statement clearly cannot amount to “deception, trickery, or
misrepresentation”—the primary basis upon which Lindvall bases his argument.
See Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶33; see also Cormican, No. 2020AP1895, ¶28.
Next, in attempting to draw parallels between his case and Blackman, Lindvall

12
At times it appears that Lindvall, in making this argument, conflates “automatic” with
“instant” or “instantaneous.” To the extent he does so, that does not alter the analysis as those
words are not inherently interchangeable in this context.

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No. 2025AP1703

concedes “Officer Campbell was not physically intimidating” and that he
“remained cooperative[.]” See Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶33. Thus, these factors
counsel in favor of voluntariness.

¶29 In regard to how Lindvall responded to the request, it is clear he was
initially uncertain and that he wavered as to whether or not to consent. However,
after initially refusing, Lindvall himself re-engaged with Officer Campbell after a
brief pause to ask additional questions, and Officer Campbell clearly and
unequivocally informed him—multiple times—that she could only provide him
with the facts, that he had to choose between consenting and not consenting, and
that she could not provide additional information because it would appear as
though she was attempting to force him to consent or sway his decision. Officer
Campbell’s repeated clarification that Lindvall himself had to choose between two
options also undermines Lindvall’s attempt to distinguish his case from Cormican
to the extent he suggests that he, unlike Cormican, “did not understand” he needed
to make a decision, see Cormican, No. 2020AP1895, ¶24, and it also confirms he
was informed “that he could refuse consent[,]” see Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶33.
As to Lindvall’s “age, intelligence, education, physical and emotional condition,
and prior experience with the police[,]” id., Lindvall did not have any prior OWI
or operating with a PAC convictions, he had sustained a head laceration in the
accident, and Officer Campbell’s body camera reveals he was visibly upset.

¶30 Taking these factors into consideration as a whole, this court is
satisfied that Lindvall voluntarily consented to the blood draw: there was no
misrepresentation, he was not physically threatened, he was cooperative, and he
was informed multiple times that he could refuse consent and that the decision was
his and his alone. Although he did waiver initially as to his decision, he ultimately

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consented—and he did so after Officer Campbell repeatedly clarified she could
not sway him or force him one way or the other.

¶31 Lindvall’s attempts to distinguish his circumstances from those in
Cormican and to draw parallels between his circumstances and those in Blackman
are unavailing. As noted, the language at issue in Cormican was nearly identical,
and this court has already rejected Lindvall’s contention that he, unlike Cormican,
did not understand that whether or not to consent was his decision. See Cormican,
No. 2020AP1895, ¶24. And, the similarities here to Blackman—including this
being Lindvall’s first offense, Lindvall remaining cooperative, and Officer
Campbell not being physically intimidating—do not overcome the crucial
distinguishing factor that the information given to Blackman was inaccurate
because Blackman was not subject to the revocation provision at all. See
Blackman, 377 Wis. 2d 339, ¶¶5, 60-66. Here, Lindvall was subject to the
revocation penalty, and he did not receive inaccurate or misleading information.
His attempt to analogize his case to Blackman fails.

¶32 As a final note, the conclusion that Officer Campbell’s statement
was not misleading for purposes of the Fourth Amendment analysis likewise leads
to the conclusion that Lindvall is not entitled to relief under Quelle, either, which
formed the basis of the circuit court’s denial of Lindvall’s suppression motion.
Pursuant to Quelle, which addressed the adequacy of the information provided
regarding the Implied Consent Law, a defendant must establish the following in
order to obtain relief: (1) that an officer failed to meet “or exceeded his or her duty
under [WIS. STAT.] §§ 343.305(4) and 343.305(4m) to provide information to the
accused driver”; (2) “the lack or oversupply of information” was misleading; and
(3) that “the failure to properly inform the driver affected his or her ability to make
the choice about chemical testing[.]” Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d at 273, 280. Here, the

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only potentially misleading information Lindvall points to is Officer Campbell’s
statement that revocation would be “automatic” if he refused the requested blood
draw, and because this court has already determined this statement was not
misleading, Lindvall cannot establish the three Quelle factors. See id.; see also
Cormican, No. 2020AP1895, ¶25.

¶33 In summary, this court concludes the challenged statement—that
license revocation would be automatic if Lindvall failed to consent to the
requested blood draw—was not misleading and that based on the totality of the
circumstances, Lindvall voluntarily consented for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Accordingly, this court affirms the circuit court’s denial of Lindvall’s suppression
motion, albeit primarily on alternate grounds.13

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

13
Because the circuit court did not err, it is unnecessary to address the City’s arguments
regarding harmless error.

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