Logan General Hospital, LLC v. Ashley Bryant

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

FILED
LOGAN GENERAL HOSPITAL, LLC, December 4, 2025
Employer Below, Petitioner ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
v.) No. 25-ICA-151 (JCN: 2024028550)

ASHLEY BRYANT,
Claimant Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Logan General Hospital, LLC (“LGH”) appeals the March 13, 2025,
order of the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (“Board”). Respondent Ashley
Bryant timely filed a response.1 LGH did not reply. The issue on appeal is whether the
Board erred in reversing the claim administrator’s October 10, 2024, order, which rejected
the claim. The Board remanded the claim to the claim administrator with instructions to
enter a protestable order identifying the compensable diagnosis in the claim and addressing
the claimant’s entitlement to temporary total disability (“TTD”) benefits.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For
these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the Board’s order is appropriate under
Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Ms. Bryant is employed as an ICU Nurse at Logan Regional Hospital. On the
morning of September 25, 2024, while at work, Ms. Bryant injured her left ankle. That
same day, Ms. Bryant completed an Employees’ and Physicians’ Report of Occupational
Injury form, where she reported an injury to her left ankle on September 25, 2024, when
she was responding to a “rapid response” call. A medical provider completed the
physician's portion of the form and indicated Ms. Bryant suffered ankle pain from an
occupational injury.

Also on September 25, 2024, Ms. Bryant sought medical treatment in the emergency
room. The medical records indicate Ms. Bryant was walking to a rapid response when she
felt and heard a pop in the left ankle joint, causing pain with weight bearing. X-rays showed
no acute abnormality, but did note small calcaneal spurs. The emergency room medical

1
LGH is represented by Jeffrey B. Brannon, Esq. Ms. Bryant is represented by
Donald C. Wandling, Esq.

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provider diagnosed Ms. Bryant with “pain in left ankle and joints of left foot-left ankle
pain,” and she was given crutches and released from work for three days. The medical
provider instructed Ms. Bryant to follow up with Ted Jefferson, D.O.

On October 10, 2024, the claim administrator determined that Ms. Bryant did not
suffer a compensable work injury. Ms. Bryant protested this order to the Board.

Ms. Bryant’s testimony was taken on November 26, 2024. According to Ms. Bryant,
a rapid response call required her to react quickly. She was on the fourth floor of the ICU
unit, where she and three other nurses received the call for a patient having a possible
stroke. While Ms. Bryant was assisting the rapid response patient on the fourth floor, she
was alerted via an overhead announcement of another rapid response patient on the third
floor. Ms. Bryant then began to make her way to the rapid response patient on the third
floor. In doing so, Ms. Bryant testified that she was “hastily” moving through a sloped,
“unlevel” tiled floor area to get to the stairway. Ms. Bryant described the floor as so uneven
that wheelchairs and other wheeled devices had to be locked in order to prevent them from
freely rolling across the area. The area in which Ms. Bryant was walking had hospital
equipment located in it, such as a bed against a wall, a telehealth cart, an ultrasound
machine, and a wheelchair. When Ms. Bryant stepped around the bed, her left ankle
popped. Ms. Bryant did not fall, but she sat on the floor until other nurses arrived with a
wheelchair to take her to the emergency room

According to Ms. Bryant, Dr. Jefferson saw her two days after the injury and
believed that she had tendonitis and placed her in a boot. Ms. Bryant also testified that on
or about October 14, 2024, she saw Dr. McCleary, an orthopedist, who believed that she
had suffered a severe left ankle sprain, and he ordered her to stop wearing the boot, to stay
off work until December, and recommended physical therapy.2 However, Ms. Bryant
returned to work the next day. Ms. Bryant also addressed a statement in the emergency
room treatment note that she “denie[d] twisting the ankle and stepping wrong.” Ms. Bryant
testified that no one in the emergency room asked her this question, and that she did not
know exactly how the injury occurred.

By order dated March 13, 2025, the Board reversed the claim administrator’s order
and found that Ms. Bryant established by a preponderance of evidence that she sustained a
personal injury to her left lower extremity in the course and as a result of her employment.
The Board determined that Ms. Bryant was performing a job duty that was unique to her

2
Dr. McCleary’s medical records are not included in the appendix.

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employment and which placed her at a greater risk of injury than that to which the general
public is exposed.

The Board also determined that the only medical diagnosis of record was left ankle
pain, and that it was “well settled” law that pain is not a compensable diagnosis. The Board
noted that Ms. Bryant testified that she was later diagnosed with a severe ankle sprain;
however, there was no medical report of record to support her testimony. Thus, the Board
remanded the claim to the claim administrator with instructions that it issue a protestable
order identifying the compensable diagnosis and addressing Ms. Bryant’s entitlement to
TTD benefits. It is from this order that LGH now appeals.

Our standard of review is set forth in West Virginia Code § 23-5-12a(b) (2022), in
part, as follows:

The Intermediate Court of Appeals may affirm the order or decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Board of Review or remand the case for further
proceedings. It shall reverse, vacate, or modify the order or decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Board of Review, if the substantial rights of the
petitioner or petitioners have been prejudiced because the Board of Review’s
findings are:

(1) In violation of statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Board of Review;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedures;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.

Syl. Pt. 2, Duff v. Kanawha Cnty. Comm’n, 250 W. Va. 510, 905 S.E.2d 528 (2024).

On appeal, LGH argues that the Board was clearly wrong in reversing the claim
administrator’s order that determined Ms. Bryant did not suffer a compensable work injury
because there is no causal connection between Ms. Bryant’s injury and her employment as
she was “simply walking” when her ankle popped. LGH also asserts that the Board was
clearly wrong in reversing the claim administrator’s order because Ms. Bryant did not
suffer an injury, as there was no compensable diagnosis. We disagree.

“‘In order for a claim to be held compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, three elements must coexist: (1) a personal injury (2) received in the course of
employment and (3) resulting from that employment.’ Syl. Pt. 1, Barnett v. State

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Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 153 W. Va. 796, 172 S.E.2d 698 (1970).” Syl. Pt. 1, Sansom
v. Workers’ Comp. Comm’r, 176 W. Va. 545, 346 S.E.2d 63 (1986).

The Board relied upon Hood v. Lincare Holdings, Inc., 249 W. Va. 108, 894 S.E.2d
890 (2023) to determine that a causal connection existed between Ms. Bryant’s injury and
her employment. In Hood, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”)
held that: “In the context of workers’ compensation law, there are four types of injury-
causing risks commonly faced by an employee at work: (1) risks directly associated with
employment; (2) risks personal to the claimant; (3) mixed risks; and (4) neutral risks.” Id.
at 110, 894 S.E.2d at 892, syl. pt. 4.

Additionally, the Board, following the guidance of the SCAWV in Hood, utilized
the increased-risk test.

The factfinder may use the increased-risk test when deciding whether an
employee sustained a compensable injury under West Virginia Code § 23-4-
1(a) (2018), in cases where the injury occurred while the employee was
engaged in a neutral risk activity. Under the increased-risk test, even if the
risk faced by the employee is not qualitatively peculiar to the employment,
the injury may be compensable if he faced an increased quantity of a risk.

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

Here, the Board found that a direct causal connection existed between Ms. Bryant’s
injury and her employment. The Board further found that Ms. Bryant was not merely
walking when her injury occurred. The Board noted that, at the time of the injury, Ms.
Bryant was moving as quickly as possible in response to a medical emergency when she
injured her left ankle while trying to maneuver around an obstacle (a hospital bed) on an
uneven floor.3 The Board found that because Ms. Bryant was moving as quickly as possible
to respond to a medical emergency, as well as maneuvering around an obstacle on an
uneven floor, she faced a risk that was increased above that faced by the general public.

Upon review, we conclude that the Board was not clearly wrong in finding that Ms.
Bryant’s employment placed her at an increased risk of injury within the meaning of Hood.

The second issue is whether Ms. Bryant suffered an injury, as there was no
compensable diagnosis. The SCAWV has previously upheld an order from the Board
holding a claim compensable and remanding the matter for the purpose of ascertaining the
appropriate compensable condition. See Constellium Rolled Prod. v. Myers, No. 20-0281,

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In West Virginia United Health System, Inc. v. DeWitt, No. 24-ICA-74, 2024 WL
4602030 (W. Va. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2024) (memorandum decision), this Court affirmed the
Board’s finding that speed elevated the claimant’s risk of injury.

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2021 WL 2580719, at *3 (W. Va. June 23, 2021) (memorandum decision) (finding that the
Board correctly remanded the matter for a determination of the compensable condition(s)
in the claim after the claimant showed by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained
an occupational injury).

Here, there is no evidence that Ms. Bryant had any pre-existing injuries.
Additionally, on the Employees’ and Physicians’ Report of Occupational Injury form, a
medical provider completed the physician’s portion of the form and indicated Ms. Bryant
suffered ankle pain from an occupational injury. Medical records indicate that the medical
provider at the emergency room gave Ms. Bryant a work release form for three days and
instructed her to follow up with Dr. Ted Jefferson. Ms. Bryant also testified to a medical
diagnosis of a sprained ankle by Dr. McCleary. As such, the Board was not clearly wrong
in finding that Ms. Bryant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained an
occupational injury and remanding the claim to the claim administrator with directions that
it issue a protestable order regarding compensable conditions and temporary total disability
benefits.

As the SCAWV has held, “[t]he ‘clearly wrong’ and the ‘arbitrary and capricious’
standards of review are deferential ones which presume an agency’s actions are valid as
long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence or by a rational basis.” Syl. Pt. 3,
In re Queen, 196 W. Va. 442, 473 S.E.2d 483 (1996). With this deferential standard of
review in mind, we cannot conclude that the Board was clearly wrong in reversing the
claim administrator’s order, which rejected the claim

Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s March 13, 2025, order.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: December 4, 2025

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge S. Ryan White

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