Shelia Hallman-Warner v. Bluefield State University, Umina Legal, and Bailey & Wyant, PLLC

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

SHELIA HALLMAN-WARNER,
Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

v.) No. 25-ICA-125 (Cir. Ct. Mercer Cnty. Case No. CC-28-2024-C-222)

BLUEFIELD STATE UNIVERSITY, FILED
UMINA LEGAL, and December 4, 2025
BAILEY & WYANT, PLLC, ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
Defendants Below, Respondents OF WEST VIRGINIA

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Shelia Hallman-Warner appeals the Circuit Court of Mercer County’s
December 9, 2024, January 30, 2025, and February 18, 2025, orders. In those orders, the
circuit court dismissed Ms. Hallman-Warner’s claims against all Respondents.
Respondents Bluefield State University (“Bluefield State”), Umina Legal, and Bailey &
Wyant, PLLC, each filed separate responses in support of the circuit court’s orders.1 Ms.
Hallman-Warner did not file a reply.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For
these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate
under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Ms. Hallman-Warner was employed as a criminal justice professor at Bluefield
State. On August 20, 2018, Ms. Hallman-Warner, by counsel, Ryan Umina, Esq., of Umina
Legal, filed a complaint against Bluefield State in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
alleging that Bluefield State intentionally provided false and misleading information to the
county prosecutor in order to maliciously prosecute a misdemeanor criminal charge against
Ms. Hallman-Warner for an incident that occurred at Bluefield State. Although the matter
was ultimately settled, Ms. Hallman-Warner sought to invalidate the settlement. The circuit
court denied her attempt to invalidate the settlement, and this Court affirmed that decision.
See Hallman-Warner v. Bluefield State Coll. Bd. of Governors, No. 22-ICA-38, 2023 WL

1
Ms. Hallman-Warner is self-represented. Bluefield State University is represented
by Chip E. Williams, Esq., and Jared C. Underwood, Esq. Umina Legal is represented by
Arie M. Spitz, Esq., and Lauren E. Motes, Esq. Bailey & Wyant, PLLC, is represented by
Michael J. Farrell, Esq., and J. Ben Shepard, Esq.

1
2367454, at *1 (W. Va. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2023) (memorandum decision). Ms. Hallman-
Warner appealed this Court’s memorandum decision to the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia, which affirmed our decision. See Hallman-Warner v. Bluefield State Coll.
Bd. of Governors, No. 23-267, 2025 WL 3286530, at *1 (W. Va. Nov. 25, 2025)
(memorandum decision).2
On March 15, 2023, Ms. Hallman-Warner filed a complaint against Mr. Umina for
malpractice, which the Circuit Court of Kanawha County ultimately dismissed. This Court
affirmed the dismissal. See Hallman-Warner v. Umina, No. 24-ICA-132, 2024 WL
5201011, at *1 (W. Va. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2024) (memorandum decision). This Court’s
memorandum decision in that matter is currently on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia.
Turning to the instant matter, on September 16, 2024, Ms. Hallman-Warner filed
her complaint against Bluefield State, Bailey & Wyant, PLLC, and Umina Legal, this time
in the Circuit Court of Mercer County. Ms. Hallman-Warner filed the complaint as “The
Professor” and not in her actual name. As mentioned previously, Bluefield State was Ms.
Hallman-Warner’s former employer and Umina Legal, through Mr. Umina, represented
Ms. Hallman-Warner in the prior litigation against Bluefield State. Bailey & Wyant, PLLC,
represented Bluefield State in the prior litigation.
The pro se complaint in the instant matter asserted claims for financial exploitation
of the elderly, financial exploitation of taxpayers, fraudulent schemes, legal malpractice,
intentional infliction of emotional pain and suffering, retaliation, civil conspiracy, undue
influence, duress, coercion, entrapment, and conspiracy.3 The complaint sought
$24,000,000 in damages. The complaint largely mirrors the allegations of Ms. Hallman-
Warner in the prior cases before the Court and alleges she was targeted for speaking out at
Bluefield State, was forced to resign her position at Bluefield State, was forced into the
prior settlement agreement as a result of duress and coercion, was treated unfairly, was
humiliated and insulted by the actions of the Respondents and the courts, and that the
various Respondents consider themselves to be above the law.
On October 17, 2024, Bailey & Wyant, PLLC, filed its motion to dismiss which
raised concerns about Ms. Hallman-Warner’s competency and asked for dismissal on the
grounds that Ms. Hallman-Warner could not sue them for malpractice as Bailey & Wyant,
PLLC, was not employed by her, the statute of limitations expired as to any claim against
it, litigation privilege shielded it from liability, Ms. Hallman-Warner failed to file suit in

2
However, the Supreme Court has not issued the mandate in that matter and
therefore the memorandum decision is not yet final. See Rule 26 W. Va. R. App. P.
(“Unless otherwise provided, an opinion or memorandum decision of the Court considering
the merits of a case is not final until the mandate has been issued.”)
3
Though unclear, Ms. Hallman-Warner may have intended the complaint to also
assert a claim for “Elder Abuse” as those words are handwritten at the end of the complaint.
2
her own name, and the complaint failed to state a claim. Similarly, on October 31, 2024,
Bluefield State moved to dismiss the complaint based on several of the same legal theories
as well as the doctrine of res judicata and a release of all claims executed as part of the
prior settlement. On November 18, 2024, Umina Legal also moved to dismiss on the
grounds that the complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and was filed after the expiration of the statutes of
limitations. Each motion was separately noticed for a hearing to occur on December 5,
2024, at 1 p.m.4
A hearing was held by the circuit court on all the motions to dismiss on December
5, 2024. In its written orders following the hearing, the circuit court notes that Ms.
Hallman-Warner was not present for the hearing, so the court attempted to solicit her
participation by calling Ms. Hallman-Warner three times and leaving her a voicemail
inviting her to participate in the hearing telephonically, though she did not respond.
Following the hearing, the circuit court dismissed the case against each Respondent in
separate orders.
On December 9, 2024, the circuit court entered the order dismissing the case against
Bailey & Wyant, PLLC. In that order, the circuit court concluded that the claims against
Bailey & Wyant, PLLC, were time barred, failed as a matter of law, were barred by
litigation privilege, were barred by the release in the settlement agreement executed by Ms.
Hallman-Warner, and Ms. Hallman-Warner otherwise failed to state a claim as to all counts
due to the insufficiency of factual allegations. The circuit court dismissed the case against
Bailey & Wyant, PLLC, with prejudice.
On January 30, 2025, the circuit court entered the order dismissing the case against
Bluefield State. In that order, the circuit court concluded that the claims against Bluefield
State were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and were otherwise time barred. The circuit
court dismissed the case against Bluefield State, with prejudice.
On February 18, 2025, the circuit court entered the order dismissing the case against
Umina Legal. In that order, the circuit court concluded that the claims against Umina Legal
were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and further, Ms. Hallman-Warner failed to
properly serve Umina Legal. The circuit court went on to conclude that certain counts of
the complaint failed to state a claim against Umina Legal, while other counts were barred
by the statute of limitations. The circuit court likewise dismissed the complaint case against
Umina Legal with prejudice.
It is from these three orders that Ms. Hallman-Warner appeals.5

4
Bluefield State filed its Notice of Hearing on November 8, 2024. Bailey & Wyant,
PLLC and Umina Legal each filed a Notice of Hearing on November 18, 2024.
5
On December 16, 2024, Ms. Hallman-Warner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the circuit court denied on January 24, 2025.
3
Our standard of review for the December 9, 2024, January 30, 2025, and February
18, 2025, orders is de novo. Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick,
Inc., 194 W. Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995) (“Appellate review of a circuit court's order
granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo.”). With this standard in mind, we turn
to the assignments of error but are mindful that “[w]hen a litigant chooses to represent
[themself], it is the duty of the [Court] to insure fairness, allowing reasonable
accommodations for the pro se litigant so long as no harm is done an adverse party[.]” Bego
v. Bego, 177 W. Va. 74, 76, 350 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1986).

On appeal, Ms. Hallman-Warner first asserts that the circuit court erred by
essentially allowing the Respondents’ attorneys to notice a hearing on their respective
motions to dismiss and by failing to grant her request to delay the hearing. We disagree.
Ms. Hallman-Warner does not cite any authority for her proposition that attorneys cannot
notice a hearing date and must instead file a motion for a hearing date with the circuit court.
Further, Rule 6(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure prescribes time frames
for the service of motions and notices of hearings which ensure an opposing party has
adequate notice. 6 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has articulated
that the purpose of the notice requirement of “Rule 6(d) is to prevent a party from being
prejudicially surprised by a motion.” Daniel v. Stevens, 183 W. Va. 95, 104, 394 S.E.2d
79, 88 (1990). Here, the record reflects that the hearing on the motions was adequately
noticed by the Respondents under the version of Rule 6(d) in effect at the time. Further, in
regard to the circuit court’s alleged failure to grant Ms. Hallman-Warner a continuance of
the hearing, there is nothing in the record that demonstrates that there was good cause for
granting a continuance of the hearing. Rule 22.05 of the West Virginia Trial Court Rules
states that “[i]f any of the parties fail to appear at an oral argument or hearing, without prior
showing of good cause for non-appearance, the court may proceed to hear and rule on the
motion.” Here, not only did Ms. Hallman-Warner receive adequate notice of the hearing,
but the circuit court then attempted to contact Ms. Hallman-Warner to obtain her telephonic
participation in the hearing, to no avail. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court did not
err in this regard.

Ms. Hallman-Warner’s second assignment of error asserts that the circuit court erred
by entering one order within four days of the hearing but also erred by delaying the entry
of the other two orders. However, Ms. Hallman-Warner has failed to demonstrate error or
prejudice on this issue. See Walker v. Fazenbaker, No. 18-1062, 2020 WL 598327, at *5
(W. Va. Feb. 7, 2020) (memorandum decision) (early entry of an order in violation of Rule
24.01 in that matter was harmless); see also Vogt v. Macy’s, Inc., 22-ICA-162, 2023 WL
4027501, at *4 (W. Va. Ct. App. June 15, 2023) (memorandum decision) (citing State v.

6
At the time the circuit court issued its order, the proceedings were governed by the
version of Rule 6 adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in 1998. Rule
6 was amended by the Supreme Court, effective January 1, 2025.

4
Lilly, 194 W. Va. 595, 605 n.16, 461 S.E.2d 101, 111 n.16 (1995) (explaining that appellate
courts frequently refuse to address undeveloped, perfunctory, or cursory arguments on
appeal)). Moreover, as our Supreme Court of Appeals has held,

An appellant must carry the burden of showing error in the judgment of
which he complains. This Court will not reverse the judgment of a trial court
unless error affirmatively appears from the record. Error will not be
presumed, all presumptions being in favor of the correctness of the judgment.

Syl. Pt. 5, Morgan v. Price, 151 W. Va. 158, 150 S.E.2d 897 (1966); Cobble v. Lester, No.
24-ICA-201, 2024 WL 5201017, at *2 (W. Va. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2024) (memorandum
decision). Ms. Hallman-Warner does not explain how she was prejudiced by the action of
the circuit court in this regard and has provided no authority to support her cursory
argument that it is reversible error for the circuit court to issue its orders in the manner that
it did. Indeed, the Rules of Civil Procedure specifically permit a circuit court to enter an
order resolving certain claims against certain parties without disposing of the entire case.
See W. Va. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (1998). Accordingly, we find that Ms. Hallman-Warner has
failed to demonstrate error in this regard.

Ms. Hallman-Warner’s third assignment of error argues that the circuit court erred
by dismissing the matter due to an incorrect statute of limitations calculation.7 Ms.
Hallman-Warner’s fourth and final assignment of error asserts that the circuit court “erred
in failure to delay action pending WV Supreme Court of Appeals decision[.]” However, it
does not appear that Ms. Hallman-Warner argued either issue in her Petitioner’s Brief. Her
brief does not contain an argument relating to either issue that “clearly exhibit[s] the points
of fact and law presented [or] the standard of review applicable” nor does the brief “cit[e]
the authorities relied on, under headings that correspond with the assignments of error.”
W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7). Further, her brief does not “contain appropriate and specific
citations to the record on appeal.” Id. Accordingly, since Ms. Hallman-Warner failed to
brief these issues, we find that she has failed to demonstrate error in either regard.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Circuit Court of Mercer County’s
December 9, 2024, January 30, 2025, and February 18, 2025, orders.

Affirmed.

7
The Court notes that it has previously decided the statute of limitations issue in
regard to Mr. Umina in Hallman-Warner v. Umina, No. 24-ICA-132, 2024 WL 5201011,
at *1 (W. Va. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2024) (memorandum decision). Insomuch as Ms. Hallman-
Warner asserts this assignment of error in regard to Umina Legal, the appeal of that
decision is currently pending before the Supreme Court of Appeals and is therefore not
properly before this Court.

5
ISSUED: December 4, 2025

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge S. Ryan White

6