Pamela Griffith v. Larry Griffith

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
FILED
PAMELA GRIFFITH,
February 27, 2026
ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
Petitioner Below, Petitioner INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA

v.) No. 25-ICA-273 (Fam. Ct. Ritchie Cnty. Case No. FC-43-2024-D-36)

LARRY GRIFFITH,
Respondent Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Pamela Griffith (“Wife”) appeals the Family Court of Ritchie County’s
June 9, 2025, Final Order and June 11, 2025, Order Regarding Motion to Reconsider Final
Order.1 In those orders, the family court, among other things, distributed the parties’ marital
property, ordered each party should be responsible for their own attorney fees, and denied
Wife’s claim for spousal support. Respondent Larry Griffith (“Husband”) did not
participate in this appeal.2

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering Wife’s arguments, the record on appeal, and the applicable
law, this Court finds that there is error in the family court’s decision but no substantial
question of law. For the reasons set forth below, a memorandum decision vacating the
family court’s order, in part, and remanding for further proceedings consistent with this
decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The parties were married in 1981 and share two children born of the marriage who
have reached the age of majority. On or around July 26, 2024, Wife filed her petition for
divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences. On August 27, 2024, Husband filed his
answer admitting irreconcilable differences.

In her financial statement, Wife listed real estate, a 2022 Mitsubishi Outlander, a
Toyota Tacoma, household furnishings and appliances, a checking account with a balance
of $450, a joint checking account with a balance of $2,400, $1,200 per month in social

1
Wife is represented by C. Blaine Myers, Esq. Husband was represented by counsel
below.
2
We recognize our limited and circumspect review of a family court order in an
uncontested appeal, like this one, where the respondent fails to participate on appeal to
support the order.
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security benefits, and separate property in the form of a fractional interest in real estate in
Doddridge County. The financial statement also noted that Wife had credit card debt of
approximately $30,000. Wife listed her monthly expenditures at $2,486 per month.
Husband did not file the required financial statement.

On October 18, 2024, the family court conducted a preliminary hearing at which
both parties and their counsel appeared; counsel for Husband appeared telephonically.
During this hearing, Husband acknowledged receiving two pensions, in addition to social
security benefits. The parties also agreed they owed marital debt to Long Reach Credit
Union. Thereafter, the family court entered a temporary order that, among other things,
ordered the marital home appraised and that the parties share the cost of the same, required
Husband to pay Wife $450 per month, which represented Wife’s share of marital pension
benefits, plus $350 per month in temporary spousal support, and ordered Husband to file a
sworn financial statement. Further, the court ordered both parties to file inventories of the
tangible personal property each had in their possession, and to provide copies of
documentation of all relevant financial matters including bank account statements,
investment account statements, and any statements regarding debts owed in advance of the
final hearing. The court deferred ruling on Wife’s request for attorney’s fees until the final
hearing.

On or about December 3, 2024, Wife filed a motion to compel and request for
interim award of attorney fees alleging that Husband refused to pay his share of the
appraisal on the marital home, refused to provide an itemization of his personal property,
failed to file a sworn financial statement, and failed to provide documentation of his bank
accounts, investment accounts, and their balances.

On January 31, 2025, Husband filed his financial statement in which Husband
disclosed that he received $1,353.44 per month in pension benefits, $2,177.10 per month
from social security, and owned numerous firearms and bows. Husband also indicated that
the parties had marital debt owed to Union Plus in the amount of $2,375.68, and to Sears
in the amount of $7,536.37. The statement also listed various monthly expenses. However,
Husband failed to list any financial accounts or their balances.

On February 10, 2025, following the hearing on Wife’s motion to compel and for
attorney’s fees, the family court entered a status order requiring Husband to reimburse Wife
for his one-half share of the cost of the home appraisal and to provide documentation of
his pension benefits and bank account information. The family court also ordered Wife to
file a supplemental financial statement. The status order also set the final hearing for April
10, 2025.

On or around April 1, 2025, Wife filed a petition for contempt alleging that Husband
failed to pay his half of the appraisal cost, failed to provide documentation of his pension
benefits, and that while he filed a sworn financial statement, he did not list any bank or

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investment account information. However, Wife asserted that she subpoenaed records from
Huntington Bank which revealed accounts with balances of $2,583.40 and $19,838.17.

At some point, Wife filed her proposed equitable distribution calculation. The
document did not include a full explanation of the figures listed but concluded that
Husband owed wife an equalization payment in the amount of $7,560, plus $1,600
representing the difference in what Wife should have received as a result of her share of
Husband’s pension benefits versus what she received as a result of the preliminary order.
Wife also filed documents that showed that her monthly income was $1,900 while her
monthly expenses totaled $3,078. Of note, Wife listed monthly expenses of $548 in credit
card payments and a future estimated rental expense of $600 per month, as she did not pay
rent at that time because she was temporarily staying in the home of a friend during the
pendency of the divorce action. Wife also filed a summary of her attorney’s fees that totaled
$10,099.35.

On May 1, 2025, the family court held a final hearing. Both parties appeared with
counsel and were placed under oath. Most of the testimony regarding the finances of the
parties was equivocal and confusing. However, Husband testified that Wife incurred a
$7,000 credit card debt, which she paid off with a loan from a bank and quickly incurred
$7,000 in debt again on the credit card. On cross examination, Wife admitted that her credit
card debt was only in her own name and she was not sure if Husband was aware of the
debt, though it was incurred during the marriage. Wife also testified that the parties had an
unsecured loan from Long Reach Federal Credit Union in the amount of approximately
$18,000 that had a monthly payment of approximately $380 that she could no longer afford
to pay. Wife admitted on cross-examination that she was no longer paying the full amount
on the loan and did not tell Husband that she was no longer paying the loan. Wife also
testified that she owed approximately $36,000 on her Mitsubishi Outlander which had a
monthly payment of $650. She further testified that although her doctor told her to stop
working while receiving cancer treatment during the pendency of the divorce, she had since
returned to working part-time as a substitute teacher’s aide earning approximately $700.00
per month. Wife also testified that she was then temporarily living alone at a friend’s home
by herself, rent free, but would like to eventually find her own place, which she estimated
would cost $600 per month. Husband remained living in the marital home on which the
parties owed no debt. Husband testified that he desired to buy Wife out of the marital home
for $75,000, which represented roughly half of the value of the home. At the end of the
hearing, the family court judge made no rulings and directed both parties to file proposed
orders.

On June 9, 2025, the family court entered its final order. In that order, the family
court ordered that Husband was to buy Wife’s interest in the marital home for $75,000
within 90 days or the home was to be placed on the open market and the net proceeds were
to be divided by the parties. Regarding the Long Reach loan, the court held that each party
would be responsible for one-half of the monthly payment until the loan was repaid. The

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court also ordered that Wife was entitled to half of Husband’s UMWA pension, which
equated to $650 per month. As to spousal support, the family court noted that Wife, then
67 years old, had been cleared to return to work, worked only two half days per week, and
paid no rent. The family court also noted that of Wife’s $3,078 monthly expenses, $548
was attributed to credit card payments, which were not “permanent” and could be reduced
or eliminated upon Wife’s receipt of payment for her one-half interest in the marital home.
Further, the family court held that the $600 per month listed as a rental expense was
“speculative”; therefore, the court would not consider that expense.

Accordingly, the family court removed the credit card debt payments and estimated
monthly rental expense from Wife’s monthly expenses and noted that the same could be
covered by her social security benefits and her share of Husband’s pension. Further, the
family court noted that Husband would incur the additional monthly expense of the loan to
buy Wife out of her interest in the marital home. As such, the family court found that no
spousal support should be awarded. Regarding attorney fees, the family court found that
after Husband paid the sums required by the order, he would lack the financial ability to
pay the Wife’s attorney fees; therefore, each party should be responsible for their own
attorney fees. The family court did not award Wife an equalization payment.

On June 9, 2025, Wife moved the family court to reconsider its final order. On June
11, 2025, the family court granted, in part, Wife’s motion to reconsider noting that Wife’s
proposed equitable distribution exhibit was confusing but ordered that Wife was entitled
to receive $1,600 from Husband to account for the difference in the amount of his pension
Wife was to receive from the time of the preliminary order until the time of the final order.
The court further awarded Wife one-half the value of Husband’s guns and crossbows,
including those not previously disclosed, and one-half the cost of the appraisal of the
marital home she had paid in full, totaling $2,982. The court refused Wife’s request for the
equalization payment. It is from this June 11, 2025, order and the June 9, 2025, final order
that Wife appeals.

For these matters, we apply the following standard of review:

When a final order of a family court is appealed to the Intermediate Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, the Intermediate Court of Appeals shall review the
findings of fact made by the family court for clear error, and the family
court’s application of law to the facts for an abuse of discretion. The
Intermediate Court of Appeals shall review questions of law de novo.

Syl. Pt. 2, Christopher P. v. Amanda C., 250 W. Va. 53, 902 S.E.2d 185 (2024); accord W.
Va. Code § 51-2A-14(c) (2005) (specifying standards for appellate court review of family
court orders).

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On appeal, Wife argues that the family court erred in its determinations regarding
equitable distribution, spousal support, and attorney’s fees. While we generally review
matters such as this under the above quoted standard, such standards contemplate family
court orders that have sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate
meaningful appellate review. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has said that
to properly review an order of a family court,

“[t]he order must be sufficient to indicate the factual and legal basis for the
[family court]’s ultimate conclusion so as to facilitate a meaningful review of
the issues presented.” Province v. Province, 196 W. Va. 473, 483, 473 S.E.2d
894, 904 (1996); see also Nestor v. Bruce Hardwood Flooring, L.P., 206 W. Va.
453, 456, 525 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1999) (“[O]ur task as an appellate court is to
determine whether the circuit court’s reasons for its order are supported by the
record.”). “Where the lower tribunals fail to meet this standard—i.e. making
only general, conclusory or inexact findings—we must vacate the judgment and
remand the case for further findings and development.” Province, 196 W. Va. at
483, 473 S.E.2d at 904.

Collisi v. Collisi, 231 W. Va. 359, 364, 745 S.E.2d 250, 255 (2013). Here, the family
court’s orders on appeal do not contain sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law
to adequately indicate the factual and legal basis for the family court’s ultimate conclusions
in regard to equitable distribution, spousal support, or attorney’s fees.

In regard to equitable distribution, West Virginia Code § 48-7-103 (2001) provides
that in the absence of a valid agreement, the family court shall equally divide all marital
property between the parties but may alter the distribution after considering the statutory
factors outlined in the statute. See W. Va. Code § 48-7-103. In Syl. Pt. 2 of Stuck v. Stuck,
218 W. Va. 605, 625 S.E.2d 367 (2005), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
held:

“Equitable distribution ... is a three-step process. The first step is to classify
the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the
marital assets. The third step is to divide the marital estate between the parties
in accordance with the principles contained in [former] W.Va. Code, 48-2-
32 [now W. Va. Code § 48-7-103].” Syllabus Point 1, Whiting v.
Whiting, 183 W. Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990).

Here, although the family court found that the marital home, Husband’s retirement
accounts, and the Long Reach debt were marital property, the family court’s orders are
devoid of any analysis of West Virginia Code § 48-7-103 in regard to the division of the

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remaining marital property.3 More specifically, the family court’s orders do not clearly
provide any analysis of the parties’ other assets and debts, such as the various bank
accounts, credit card debts, debts owed to Union Plus and Sears, personal property, or the
parties’ vehicles and their associated debt or value. Accordingly, the family court’s orders
failed to adequately indicate the factual and legal basis for the family court’s ultimate
conclusion in regard to equitable distribution. Therefore, we vacate and remand for further
analysis on equitable distribution.

Turning to the issue of spousal support, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia has explained that as long as the family court fully considers the mandatory
statutory factors contained in West Virginia Code § 48-6-301 (2018), and the award of
spousal support is within the parameters of reasonableness, a reviewing court should not
disturb the award on appeal. See Mulugeta v. Misailidis, 239 W. Va. 404, 410, 801 S.E.2d
282, 288 (2017) (citation omitted). Here, the family court’s orders do not reflect that the
family court considered any of the mandatory factors contained in West Virginia Code §
48-6-301. Accordingly, the family court’s orders failed to adequately indicate the factual
and legal basis for the family court’s ultimate conclusion to deny Wife’s claim for spousal
support.4

Regarding attorney’s fees, the family court is required to conduct an analysis
pursuant to Syl. Pt. 4, Banker v. Banker, 196 W. Va. 535, 474 S.E.2d 465 (1996), which
states:
In divorce actions, an award of attorney’s fees rests initially within the sound
discretion of the family law master and should not be disturbed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion. In determining whether to award attorney’s
fees, the family law master should consider a wide array of factors including
the party’s ability to pay his or her own fee, the beneficial results obtained
by the attorney, the parties’ respective financial conditions, the effect of the
attorney’s fees on each party’s standard of living, the degree of fault of either
party making the divorce action necessary, and the reasonableness of the
attorney’s fee request.

However, in the case at bar, the family court did not conduct any Banker analysis.
Accordingly, the family court’s orders failed to adequately indicate the factual and legal
basis for the family court’s ultimate conclusion to deny Wife’s request for attorney’s fees,
and the matter is vacated and remanded with instructions for the family court to conduct
the requisite Banker analysis.

3
The Court notes that the family court’s final order indicates that the disposition of
the marital home was accomplished by agreement of the parties.
4
We note that Wife sought only $350.00 per month in spousal support.
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Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we vacate the family court’s June 9, 2025,
Final Order and June 11, 2025, Order Regarding Motion to Reconsider Final Order as they
pertain to the issues of equitable distribution, spousal support, and attorney’s fees and
remand this matter to the family court with instructions to issue an order containing
sufficient findings of fact, conclusions of law, and legal analysis as specifically detailed
herein to facilitate meaningful appellate review and to conduct such further proceedings as
it deems necessary to accomplish that end.

Vacated, in part, and Remanded, with instructions.

ISSUED: February 27, 2026

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge S. Ryan White

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